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12.8 经济系Seminar：Ordeal Mechanisms and Training in the Provision of SubsidizedProducts in Developing Countries
发布时间：2014-11-25
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主 题：发展中国家受资助产品提供的严格机制和培训— 根据随机控制实验的发现
主讲人：Ma, Xiaochen 加州大学-戴维斯分校
时 间：2014年12月8日 （星期一）15:00 - 16:30
地 点：后主楼1620
主讲人简介：
Xiaochen Ma is a Ph.D. candidate at University of California, Davis and a visitingdoctoral student at Stanford Center for International Development. Since 2012, he has been working as the Field Principal Investigator at Rural Education Action Program in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His researchfocuses on Economics of Development and Applied Econometrics with an emphasis oneducation, health and nutrition. Ma’s published works include British Medical Journal, China Economic Review, China & World Economy, International Journal of EducationalDevelopment. He serves as a referee of Economic Development and Cultural Change.
内容提要：
The cost-effectiveness of policies providing welfare-enhancing products for free or athighly subsidized prices is often compromised by the fact that many individuals do not use theproducts provided. The cost-effectiveness of these distribution programs can thus be improved byeither targeting products to individuals more likely to use the product being provided or byincreasing usage among those receiving the product. In this paper we present the results of a fieldexperiment testing two policy instruments designed to improve the cost-effectiveness of aprogram to distribute free eyeglasses to myopic children in rural China. We first study how wellan ordeal mechanism—imposing a non-monetary cost on recipients to acquire a product—targetsthe provision of eyeglasses to those who would use them and saves program resources byscreening out those who would not. Our second intervention aims to increase uptake and usage byproviding a training program on the benefits of eyeglasses and addressing misinformation thatcontributes to low levels of usage. We test how both of these approaches independently andjointly affect the cost-effectiveness of the program and overall usage of eyeglasses. Our resultsimply that both interventions improve cost-effectiveness relative to pure free distribution withoutcompromising the primary policy goal of increasing overall usage. Combining the twointerventions, however, provides no additional benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness orincreasing usage relative to either intervention alone.
主讲人：Ma, Xiaochen 加州大学-戴维斯分校
时 间：2014年12月8日 （星期一）15:00 - 16:30
地 点：后主楼1620
主讲人简介：
Xiaochen Ma is a Ph.D. candidate at University of California, Davis and a visitingdoctoral student at Stanford Center for International Development. Since 2012, he has been working as the Field Principal Investigator at Rural Education Action Program in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His researchfocuses on Economics of Development and Applied Econometrics with an emphasis oneducation, health and nutrition. Ma’s published works include British Medical Journal, China Economic Review, China & World Economy, International Journal of EducationalDevelopment. He serves as a referee of Economic Development and Cultural Change.
内容提要：
The cost-effectiveness of policies providing welfare-enhancing products for free or athighly subsidized prices is often compromised by the fact that many individuals do not use theproducts provided. The cost-effectiveness of these distribution programs can thus be improved byeither targeting products to individuals more likely to use the product being provided or byincreasing usage among those receiving the product. In this paper we present the results of a fieldexperiment testing two policy instruments designed to improve the cost-effectiveness of aprogram to distribute free eyeglasses to myopic children in rural China. We first study how wellan ordeal mechanism—imposing a non-monetary cost on recipients to acquire a product—targetsthe provision of eyeglasses to those who would use them and saves program resources byscreening out those who would not. Our second intervention aims to increase uptake and usage byproviding a training program on the benefits of eyeglasses and addressing misinformation thatcontributes to low levels of usage. We test how both of these approaches independently andjointly affect the cost-effectiveness of the program and overall usage of eyeglasses. Our resultsimply that both interventions improve cost-effectiveness relative to pure free distribution withoutcompromising the primary policy goal of increasing overall usage. Combining the twointerventions, however, provides no additional benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness orincreasing usage relative to either intervention alone.