【报告题目】The Effect of Increased Audit Disclosure on Managerial Decision Making: Evidence from Disclosing Critical Audit Matters

【时间】2018年12月5日 10:00-11:40

【地点】后主楼1722会议室

【主讲人】王颖      美国麻省大学Amherst分校

【主持人】崔学刚  北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

【摘要】

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently issued a standard that requires auditors to provide information on “critical audit matters” (CAMs) identified during the financial statement audit. While regulators intend to add value to audit reports by asking auditors to disclose more information, it is unknown whether and how increased auditor disclosure will alter managers’ decision making. We conduct three experiments in two different decision settings (whether to use derivatives or issue a new loan program) and test how a CAM disclosure requirement changes managers’ decisions based on the risk implications of the decision. In our main experiment with derivatives, we find that a CAM disclosure increases managers’ willingness to speculate (a risk-increasing transaction), but decreases managers’ willingness to hedge (a risk-decreasing transaction). Consistently, in supplemental experiments with auto loans, we find that CAM disclosures make managers more likely to issue risk-increasing loans, but less likely to issue risk-decreasing loans. Taken together, our results suggest that CAM disclosures elicit strategic managerial responses in such a way that may encourage risk-increasing activities and reduce risk-decreasing activities.

Keywords: critical audit matters (CAMs); auditor reporting model; managerial decision making; operating distortion

【主讲人简介】

王颖，  美国麻省大学Amherst分校（University of Massachusetts Amherst）Isenberg管理学院会计学教授，主要研究领域为财务报告与审计中的个人判断与决策。研究兴趣包括语言特征对投资者判断的影响；财务报告和审计实践对管理人员经营决策的非预期后果；环境因素对审计师不确定估计判断的影响。已在国际会计学术顶尖期刊 Journal of Accounting Research 发表论文 3 篇，在 The Accounting Review 发表论文 1 篇。目前承担 Accounting, Organizations and Society 、 Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 、 Behavioral Research in Accounting 等著名会计学术期刊的编委会委员。