题  目：Designing Heaven’s Will: Lessons in Market Design from the Chinese Imperial Civil Servants Match

时  间：11月15号（周四）10:00-11:30

地  点：后主楼1610

主讲人：Li Chen (University of Gothenburg)

Abstract：This paper presents the evolution of a centralized matching mechanism that was in place for the assignment of civil servants from the late 16th century to early 20th century in China. Based on original documents and historical studies, we provide the first formal description of this procedure: candidates were assigned to jobs through a sequential lottery-based procedure, and they could not be assigned to their home regions, known as the rule of avoidance. By constructing a general model of sequential random matching, we first show that the procedure was not efficient, defined as maximality of the matching. We then show prioritizing “hard to match” candidates and jobs improves efficiency. This provides theoretical foundation for a policy change in 1824. We further provide conditions under which the sequential lottery-based procedure is efficient.

主讲人介绍：陈栗，瑞典哥德堡大学经济系助理教授。2016年获得比利时布鲁塞尔自由大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域包括应用微观经济、市场设计。