Grabbing hand vs. Grease of Wheel:

Anti-corruption campaign and Innovation in China

主讲人：曹思未，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

时  间：10月29日（周一）下午2点至4点

地  点：后主楼1610

【摘要】We show that Xi Jin Ping’s anti-corruption campaign and removal of officials at the provincial and prefectural city level governments have differential effects on  innovation. We exploit the exogenous timing of removal of officials to identify the causal effects of anti-corruption on innovation in a Differences-in-Differences specification. Examining patent filings at the prefectural city level, we find that removal of corrupted provincial high-ranking officials increases patenting by 10%-14%; in contrast, removal of corrupted city level high-ranking officials decreases patenting by 10%. At the firm level, exploiting the political connections between firms and government politicians, we find the negative impact is mainly manifested through local SOE enterprises. Our results suggest that the “grabbing hand” effect of official corruption dominate at the provincial level whereas the “grease of wheel” effect prevails at the city level.