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03.11 行为与实验经济学双周讨论会
发布时间：2016-03-09
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时 间：2016年3月11日（周五）11:30
地 点：后主楼1610
主讲人：陈济冬 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院
主讲人简介：
陈济冬, 2007年毕业于武汉大学数理金融试验班， 2007年-2009年就读于清华经管学院经济学系，2009年-2016年就读于普林斯顿大学，2016年获博士学位。现任北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院讲师，在《American Journal of Political Science》、《世界经济》等杂志发表论文。主要研究方向包括：公共经济学与制度经济学、博弈论、中国经济与治理、实验经济学。
Title: Tentative and definite policy proposals in committees: An experimental study
Abstract: We experimentally study a two-stage legislative bargaining game with incomplete information, consisting of one proposer and two voters. While the proposer’s ideal policy and the default policy if the proposal is eventually rejected are common knowledge, the two voters’ ideal policies are private information. We study two different institutional arrangement: first-stage proposals can be either tentative (i.e., “straw polls”) or definite. The bargaining outcome depends crucially on the opportunity and type of communication. Observed proposals and voting are explained well by our comparative statics Perfect Bayesian predictions. However, proposers often do not exploit information in straw polls when the tentative proposal is accepted. Our results have important implications for the design of committee decision-making.
地 点：后主楼1610
主讲人：陈济冬 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院
主讲人简介：
陈济冬, 2007年毕业于武汉大学数理金融试验班， 2007年-2009年就读于清华经管学院经济学系，2009年-2016年就读于普林斯顿大学，2016年获博士学位。现任北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院讲师，在《American Journal of Political Science》、《世界经济》等杂志发表论文。主要研究方向包括：公共经济学与制度经济学、博弈论、中国经济与治理、实验经济学。
Title: Tentative and definite policy proposals in committees: An experimental study
Abstract: We experimentally study a two-stage legislative bargaining game with incomplete information, consisting of one proposer and two voters. While the proposer’s ideal policy and the default policy if the proposal is eventually rejected are common knowledge, the two voters’ ideal policies are private information. We study two different institutional arrangement: first-stage proposals can be either tentative (i.e., “straw polls”) or definite. The bargaining outcome depends crucially on the opportunity and type of communication. Observed proposals and voting are explained well by our comparative statics Perfect Bayesian predictions. However, proposers often do not exploit information in straw polls when the tentative proposal is accepted. Our results have important implications for the design of committee decision-making.