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06.24 经济系Seminar： CEO Incentives: Measurement, Determinants, and Impact on Performance
发布时间：2015-06-15
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演讲主题：CEO Incentives: Measurement, Determinants, and Impact on Performance
演讲时间：2015年6月24日（星期三）14:00-15:30
地点：后主楼1610
演讲嘉宾：唐红飞，Seton Hall University
主持人：何浩然，北京师范大学经管学院
内容提要：
This paper examines the determinants of different measures of CEO incentives and their link to firm performance. These incentive measures include pay-performance elasticity (PPE), pay-performance semi-elasticity (PPSE), and the traditional pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). We clarify the theoretical settings under which each measure best captures incentives and provide insight into the determinants of the optimal level of incentives. Consistent with model predictions, our empirical analysis finds that larger, more R&D intensive, and less risky firms have higher PPE, while older and longer tenured CEOs have lower PPE. The results on size and risk are not only intuitively plausible, they help resolve some puzzling prior empirical findings
that were obtained using PPS as the measure of incentives. Concerning the impact of incentives on performance as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, we find that performance is generally first increasing and eventually decreasing in PPE and PPSE, while results using PPS are mixed.
Furthermore, a deviation from the PPE or PPSE level predicted by our determinants appears detrimental to firm performance. Our evidence thus suggests that CEO effort has a multiplicative impact on firm performance and on average firms are providing close to the optimal level of incentives.
主讲人简介：
唐红飞，现为Seton Hall大学副教授。主要研究领域为公司金融和市场交易基金。他于近几年在Journal of Banking and Finance 、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis等一系列国际权威刊物上发表多篇论文。