【题  目】Subsidizing Children or Innovation? The Optimal Fiscal Policies in an Endogenous Growth Economy

【时  间】2026年9月11日（星期五），10:00-11:30

【地  点】后主楼1722会议室

【主讲人】曹佳 讲  师（中国人民大学应用经济学院）

【主持人】刘盼 副教授（北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院）

摘要：

This paper develops a unified endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility, monopolistic competition in intermediate goods, and a fiscal authority that taxes final output to subsidize the activities of raising children and innovation. We derive four key propositions. First, an Empty Planet steady state with negative population growth exists whenever child subsidies are below a critical threshold. Second, in the Expanding Cosmos steady state, child subsidies unambiguously raise population growth. Third, innovation subsidies have asymmetric effects: they stimulate fertility in the growth regime but are completely ineffective in the stagnation regime. Fourth, there exists a critical knowledge-per-capita threshold; if the economy's initial state exceeds this threshold, even optimal policies cannot prevent long-run population decline. We characterize the Ramsey optimal policy mix and show that the optimal ratio of children to innovation subsidies is proportional to the relative strength of fertility externalities versus innovation externalities.

报告人简介：

曹佳，中国人民大学应用经济学院讲师。他2012年本科毕业于武汉大学，获经济学与理学学士学位，2015年于武汉大学取得金融学硕士学位，2020年于爱荷华州立大学取得经济学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为宏观经济学、劳动经济学、家庭经济学、国际贸易等，重点关注宏观政策和制度对家庭决策和福利的影响。他的研究论文发表于Journal of Population Economics, Journal of Development Studies, Review of Development Economics, The World Economy, China Economic Review等学术期刊。