【题  目】Unemployment Volatility and Wage Dispersion with Optimal Incentive Contracts

【时  间】2024年11月19日（星期二），13:00-14:30

【地  点】后主楼1610会议室

【主讲人】杨有智 教  授（上海财经大学经济学院）

【主持人】刘  盼 副教授（北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院）

摘要：We develop a two-stage calibration method for search models.In the first stage, without the need to specify how wages are determined,we show that in order to generate the observed large unemployment volatility,it’s both necessary and sufficient for the profit elasticity with respect to productivity to be above a lower bound.In the second stage, we show that optimal incentive contracts can account for unemployment volatility and wage dispersion simultaneously,even when the value of non-market activity is procyclical and wages are flexible.Moreover,it is shown that unemployment insurance can increase output by encouraging more socially-efficient contracts.

报告人简介：2009年获得美国爱荷华州立大学博士学位，现任上海财经大学经济学院常任教授，研究领域为宏观经济学、劳动力市场、动态契约理论，研究成果发表于Journal of Monetary Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、International Economic Review、Review of Economic Dynamics、Games and Economic Behavior等国际权威期刊，主持国家自然科学基金青年项目，参与国家自然科学基金应急项目、专项项目等。