发布时间：2010-06-22
浏览量：
演讲嘉宾：马帅
Doctor Student of the University of Oklahoma
演讲题目:
Are Auditors’ Reputation Concerns Sufficient Absent Litigation Costs?
主持人：张海燕
演讲时间：2010年6月27日晚7:00-10:00
地点：电子楼MBA教室
Are Auditors’ Reputation Concerns Sufficient Absent Litigation Costs?
ABSTRACT
Using data from the Chinese market, where litigation concerns were negligible before 2002, I conduct a partner level study on whether reputation is a sufficient incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits if there are no significant litigation costs, and I also investigate the impact of investor protection improvement at 2002 in China on the role of reputation in the audit market. The reputation hypothesis predicts that vigilant auditors establish their reputation as being more effective at mitigating bias in financial reports and then are rewarded with additional clients, and thus reputation motivates auditors to provide high-quality audits. As implied in the reputation hypothesis, auditors with better reputation should get more and greater clients and thus audit more assets, if reputation is an effective incentive for auditors. In other words, auditors who audit more assets should be those with higher audit quality and more reputational capital, if reputation does motivate auditors to provide high quality audits. This study examines the reputation hypothesis by testing this implication. Consistent with the reputation hypothesis, I find audit partners who audit more assets have higher audit quality and charge higher audit fees. However, these audit partners are associated with higher audit quality only from 2002, when the institutional environments became more investor-friendly, but not before 2002, when litigation concerns were negligible. Collectively, my findings suggest that reputation is an effective incentive for auditors only if there are effective investor protection institutions.
