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12.3首都教育经济研究院：Lunch Seminar
发布时间：2014-11-25
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题 目：Matching Mechanisms, Matching Quality, and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from China
匹配机制，匹配质量和策略行为--来自中国高考数据的经验分析
演讲人：吴斌珍 副教授 清华大学
时 间：2014年12月3日12:30-14:00
地 点：科技楼C区310
讲座摘要：
The school-choice literature has predicted that the Boston (BOS) mechanism is not strategy-proof and can deliver unfair matching outcomes. The serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism, a special case of the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, can help address these problems. However, there is little empirical evidence based on field data. This paper fills in the gap by exploiting a rich dataset from a Chinese high-school that provides information on students’ reported preference and matching outcomes during the college admissions. We find that given the college entrance exam score, female students are matched with worse colleges than male students under the BOS mechanism. The main reason is that females choose worse colleges as their first-choices when reporting their preferences. These gender differences disappear when we switch from the BOS to the SD mechanism. However, compared with the Boston mechanism, the SD mechanism neither improves the average fairness of matching outcomes, nor reduces the average preference manipulation significantly.
演讲人简介：
吴斌珍，女，清华大学经管学院经济系副教授。2006年获威斯康星大学麦迪迅分校经济学博士，2001年获北京大学经济研究中心经济学硕士，1998年获西安交通大学核能与热能工程学士。主要讲授课程包括：公共经济学，公共财政学，中级宏观经济学。
研究领域包括公共经济学、发展经济学、应用微观经济学。主持过国家自科基金和清华大学自助的科研项目。在Games and Economics Behavior、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Economic Perspectives、Journal of Comparative Economics、Economic Development and Cultural Change、China Quarterly等国际期刊和《经济研究》《中国社会科学》《经济学季刊》等国内期刊发表过学术论文。
目前担任清华大学财政税收研究及清华大学经济社会数据中心研究员。
匹配机制，匹配质量和策略行为--来自中国高考数据的经验分析
演讲人：吴斌珍 副教授 清华大学
时 间：2014年12月3日12:30-14:00
地 点：科技楼C区310
讲座摘要：
The school-choice literature has predicted that the Boston (BOS) mechanism is not strategy-proof and can deliver unfair matching outcomes. The serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism, a special case of the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, can help address these problems. However, there is little empirical evidence based on field data. This paper fills in the gap by exploiting a rich dataset from a Chinese high-school that provides information on students’ reported preference and matching outcomes during the college admissions. We find that given the college entrance exam score, female students are matched with worse colleges than male students under the BOS mechanism. The main reason is that females choose worse colleges as their first-choices when reporting their preferences. These gender differences disappear when we switch from the BOS to the SD mechanism. However, compared with the Boston mechanism, the SD mechanism neither improves the average fairness of matching outcomes, nor reduces the average preference manipulation significantly.
演讲人简介：
吴斌珍，女，清华大学经管学院经济系副教授。2006年获威斯康星大学麦迪迅分校经济学博士，2001年获北京大学经济研究中心经济学硕士，1998年获西安交通大学核能与热能工程学士。主要讲授课程包括：公共经济学，公共财政学，中级宏观经济学。
研究领域包括公共经济学、发展经济学、应用微观经济学。主持过国家自科基金和清华大学自助的科研项目。在Games and Economics Behavior、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Economic Perspectives、Journal of Comparative Economics、Economic Development and Cultural Change、China Quarterly等国际期刊和《经济研究》《中国社会科学》《经济学季刊》等国内期刊发表过学术论文。
目前担任清华大学财政税收研究及清华大学经济社会数据中心研究员。