主  题：Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?

时  间：2014年5月12日 15:00-16:30

地  点：后主楼1610

主讲人：刘潇 清华大学经管学院经济系助理教授

主持人：何浩然 助理教授

内容简介：Organizations are increasingly outsourcing tasks once performed in-house to wider participants on the Internet by hosting online contests. In practice, two types of mechanisms are used to organize these contests: simultaneous (blind) and sequential (open). In a simultaneous contest, contestants submit their solutions independently without access to one another’s submissions, while in a sequential contest, contestants submit their solutions sequentially and each can view all prior submissions before making their decisions. Most prior theoretical and experimental research has focused on simultaneous contests, with only a handful that have studied sequential ones. In this paper, under the condition of incomplete information, we analytically show that simultaneous contests produce higher quality best solutions than sequential contests. Using a laboratory experiment, we test this theoretical prediction as well as the prediction that simultaneous contests are more efficient than sequential contests. Our data support both predictions. We also discover that as the number of contestants increases, the efficiency of sequential contests drops significantly,further reducing their performance relative to simultaneous contests.

主讲人简介：刘潇，女，清华大学经管学院经济系助理教授（2012至今），于2006年获得中国人民大学学士，2012年获得美国密歇根大学博士学位。研究领域包括实验经济学，行为经济学和博弈论。论文发表在Management Science, Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊上，从2014至今担任Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics杂志的编委，是国内行为和实验经济学领域最有影响力的学者之一。