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2月23日 Seminar – XIAO Jun博士
发布时间：2012-02-20
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主题：Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous Prizes
主持人：经济与工商管理学院经济系主任罗楚亮副教授
主讲人：XIAO Jun博士
时间：2012年2月23日下午2:30-4:00
地点：北师大后主楼1610
Abstract
This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for multiple heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or "score". The first prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second, less valuable prize to the player with the second-highest score, etc. Players are asymmetric in that they incur different constant costs per-unit of score. The prize sequence is assumed to be either quadratic or geometric. I show that each such contest has a unique Nash equilibrium and exhibit an algorithm to construct the equilibrium. I then apply the main result to study: (a) the issue of tracking students in schools, (b) the incentive effects of "superstars", and (c) the optimality of winner-take-all contests.
Introduction of the presenter
Jun Xiao graduated from Wuhan University in 2004 with B.A. in Finance and B.S. in Mathematics. After obtaining a master degree in Economics from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, he is now a PhD candidate at the Department of Economics in Pennsylvania State University. He focuses on topics in game theory such as contests, bargaining and auctions. His research on contests is related to designing competition in sports and schools, and his study on bargaining examines bargaining orders in multiple-person bargaining games.