【讲座题目】Does High Cash Compensation Compromise the Independence of Outside Directors? Evidence from Directors’ Dissenting Votes

【时间】2019年5月24日（周五）中午12：30

【地点】后主楼  1629 会议室

【主讲人】厦门大学管理学院会计系 罗进辉教授

【主持人】北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院会计系  郝颖教授

【摘要】

Using data on directors’ voting behavior in board meetings, we examine whether high cash compensation compromises outside directors’ independence in monitoring executives. The results show that highly paid outside directors are more likely to vote against proposals sponsored by executives, particularly in firms with weaker monitoring of executives. Highly paid outside directors are positively associated with cash dividends and future firm performance. Overall the evidence suggests that high cash compensation reflects the market value of reputable outside directors who effectively monitor executives and contribute to firm performance.

【主讲人简介】

罗进辉，厦门大学管理学院会计系教授、博士生导师。目前的主要研究方向为资本市场财务会计与公司治理，近年来已在《会计研究》、《金融研究》、《管理科学学报》、《中国工业经济》、Journal of Accounting and Public Policy、Journal of Banking and Finance、Journal of Business Ethics等国内外权威刊物上发表多篇学术论文。曾获得全国百篇优秀管理案例奖和霍英东教育基金会青年教师奖，入选财政部会计高端（后备）人才（学术类）培养计划、福建省高等学校新世纪优秀人才支持计划、福建省高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划和厦门大学南强青年拔尖人才支持计划。