题目：Does External Monitoring from Government Improve the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises?

时间：12月13日 14:00-15:30

地点：后主楼1610

演讲人：张红松（香港大学）

主持人：戴觅

摘要：This paper investigates how external monitoring from government influences the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), by affecting managerial expropriation in procurement (proxied by input prices) and shirking in production management (proxied by productivity). Because firm-level input prices are usually not observed, we apply a structural approach of production function estimation to estimate them together with firm-level productivity, providing a methodologically practical approach to overcome the common data limitation. Using a nationwide policy shock in China that strengthened government monitoring on SOEs exclusively, we find enhancing monitoring can substantially improve SOEs’ input prices and productivity. Moreover, as spatial-dimension evidence, higher monitoring costs increase input prices paid by SOEs and reduce productivity. Such negative effect is largely alleviated by the monitoring-strengthening policy. The results suggest that government monitoring can be an effective policy instrument to improve SOE performance.

演讲者简介：张红松，现任香港大学助理教授，宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为实证产业组织、国际贸易以及应用微观经济学。主要研究方向包括生产率和需求冲击的测度、企业创新、以及企业在进出口、新产品开发、进入退出以及投资方面的动态调整。研究成果发表于International Economic Review, European Economic Review等国际一流期刊。