演讲人：Jens Grosser 教授

时间：2018年5月 8日 下午2:00-3:30

地点：后主楼1722

摘要：We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen‐candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, with even greater polarization, when voters have directional information about candidates’ ideal points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this directional information is welfare enhancing because the inefficiency from greater polarization is outweighed by lower entry expenses and better voter information. Third, entry rates are decreasing in group size and the entry cost. These findings are all implied by properties of the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium cutpoint pair of the entry game. Quantitatively, we observe too little (too much) entry when the theoretical entry rates are high (low). This general pattern of observed biases in entry rates is implied by logit quantal response equilibrium.　　

演讲人简介：Jens Grosser 教授毕业于Amsterdam 大学 和 Tinbergen 研究所，获经济学博士学位。现任教于Florida State University。主要研究方向包括实验和行为经济学、博弈论以及在多人集体决策问题中的应用。他曾在很多知名学术机构担任访问学者，包括：德国Cologne大学、普林斯顿高级研究中心(Institute for Advanced Studies)和加州理工大学 (Caltech)。Grosser 教授在相关领域做出了一系列出色的研究，其研究成果发表于一流学术期刊，包括Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, American Political Science Review, and American Journal of Political Science 等。