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05.16经济系Seminar:普选体制下的社会冲突:基于动态模型的分析
发布时间:2016-05-09       浏览量:
主    题:普选体制下的社会冲突:基于动态模型的分析
演讲人:Andrew Little, 美国康奈尔大学(Cornell University)
时    间:5月16号(周一)下午3:00-4:30
地    点:后主楼1620

摘要:
Elections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating non-violent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections also have an indirect effect of decreasing levels of violence at all other times, as parties can wait for the election when their efforts are more likely to succeed. The direct and indirect effects generate a ``political violence cycle'' that peaks at the election. However, when the indirect effect is larger, politics would be more violent without elections. When elections also provide an effective non-violent means to contest for power, they unambiguously make society more peaceful while still generating a political violence cycle.

个人简介:
Andrew Little, 康奈尔大学(Cornell University)助理教授。2013年从纽约大学(NYU)博士毕业。主要研究领域包括应用政治经济学、博弈论、信息经济学等。他的众多研究成果已经和即将发表在国际知名期刊,如American Political Science Review, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics等。