题目： The Determinants of Environmental Policy and Environmental Protection for Sale: Empirical Evidence from the United States

摘要： Given the existence of environmental political contributions that support the economic theory of regulation, this paper investigates the determinants of endogenously formed environmental policy in a political context using U.S. manufacturing data at the industry level. Using Grossman and Helpman‘s (1994) framework, I show that distorted pollution tax mimics a Ramsey rule dependent on the reciprocal of the elasticity of violation with respect to environmental policy. Elasticity of violation is calculated using a modifed Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) econometric strategy that derives the industry-level specication based on microfoundations of firms' rational behavior and overcomes the endogeneity of environmental policy. Empirical regressions show that elasticity of violation have a signicantly positively effect on pollution tax proxied by abatement cost per unit emission, and the effect depends on the level of damage indicator.

时间：12月25日14：30——16：00

地点：主楼B区524