通知公告
首页»
通知公告
通知公告
03.26 会计与财务研究论坛（14）
发布时间：2018-03-20
浏览量：
演讲主题：The Economic Consequence of Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC regulation on Related Party Transactions
讲座时间：2018年3月26日13：30—15：30
讲座地点：后主楼1722
演讲嘉宾：路海昊，副教授，加拿大滑铁卢大学
主持人：崔学刚，教授，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院会计系
Abstract: This paper examines the economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation mandating public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, I find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, suggesting an improvement in RPT governance. This reduction is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage, weaker product-market competition, and lower institutional ownership. I also find that the disclosure effect is conditional on the types of RPTs and on the identities of the parties involved. Specifically, the disclosure effect concentrates on RPTs with the CEO, with the chairman of the board, and with directors, and on RPTs involving sales, leases, or loans, suggesting these transactions are more likely used for expropriation. Finally, I find that the disclosure of RPT governance reduces the implied costs of capital (ICC) associated with RPTs. I examine two possible mechanisms reducing the costs of capital and find that the governance channel is the main contributing factor over the information channel. My inferences are robust to the use of either the volume or amount of RPTs. Taken together, this study provides evidence about how disclosure on governance can enhance firms’ governance and about the real effects of the 2006 SEC’s regulation.
嘉宾简介：路海昊，加拿大滑铁卢大学会计与金融学院副教授，曾在Journal of Business Finance and Accounting期刊发表学术论文，并担任Accounting Horizon、Journal of Corporate Finance和Contemporary Accounting Research期刊匿名审稿人。
北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院会计系