北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院
 
 
 

2018.01.02讲座:Why do employers not pay less than advertised? Directed search and the Diamond paradox
发布日期: 2017-12-26  浏览次数:

时 间:2018年1月2日(周二)下午15:00-17:00
地 点:后主楼1610室
主讲人:Friedrich Poeschel, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

[Abstract]: When employers advertise wages to attract applicants, it is not clear why employers do not renege on these advertisements ex post. Existing models typically assume that employers are somehow committed to their advertisements. This paper provides an economic explanation that aligns with the empirical evidence. Workers' expectations are fixed by advertisements, and they interpret reneging as a deviation by the employer from mutually beneficial cooperation. By consequence, the worker will exert less effort during the employment relationship if the employer reneges on the advertisement. To avoid this, sufficiently patient employers choose not to renege, and commitment to advertisements arises endogenously. The model in the paper can explain why the Diamond paradox does normally not arise in practice and its elements are supported by evidence from various surveys, case studies and field experiments.

[About the presenter]
Friedrich Poeschel works as migration economist at the OECD (International Migration Division) where he analyses all aspects of migration and integration, often with a view towards policy responses. After studies in economics at LSE, Oxford, and ENS Paris, he obtained a doctorate in economics from the University of Oxford. The subject was the use of signals in the context of search and matching, particularly labour markets, and the implications for efficiency. He then held academic jobs at the University of Rome "Tor Vergata", the Ecole Polytechnique, and the IAB Institute for Employment Research. He maintains a research affiliation with the Institute for Economic Theory II (Prof. Michael Burda) at Humboldt University Berlin.


 

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