12.15会计系Seminar：Shareholder Litigation and Insider Trading
发布日期： 2016-12-09 浏览次数：
题 目：Shareholder Litigation and Insider Trading
时 间：2016年12月15日（星期四） 14:00-15:30
嘉 宾：李煦 香港大学副教授
李煦，香港大学会计系副教授，早年分别毕业于Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston College和对外经贸大学，分获博士、硕士和学士。 曾在Lehigh University 和University of Texas at Dallas从事教学工作。文章发表于The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics ,Journal of Financial Research，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Research in Accounting Regulation, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting等国际权威期刊。
Lucrative insider trading is prevalent and can be driven by information advantage, but how to effectively regulate insider trading is still open to debate. In this paper, we examine how shareholder litigation shapes insider trading profit, exploiting the exogenous reduction in litigation threat generated by the 1999 ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. We find that following the ruling, relative to firms in other circuits, the treated firms in the Ninth Circuit states made more profits from insider trading, especially from insider sales and opportunistic sales. This effect is more profound for firms with high exposure to shareholder litigation. We further show that the results are insensitive to a battery of robustness checks, such as controlling for insider fixed effects and time trends, excluding high-tech, Internet, and IPO firms from the sample, and using a sample matched on industry and firm characteristics.